Introduction
Two-player PD is about two criminals (referred hereafter as players) who are arrested after having committed a crime. The investigators have the following plan to make them confess their crime. Both are placed in separate cells and are not allowed to communicate. They are contacted individually and are asked to choose between two choices (strategies): to confess (D) and not to confess (C), where C and D stand for Cooperation and Defection and this well-known wording of their available choices refers to the fellow prisoner and not to the authorities.
The rules state that if neither prisoner confesses, i.e. (C, C), both are given freedom; when one prisoner confesses (D) and the other does not (C), i.e. (C, D) or (D, C), the prisoner who confesses gets freedom as well as financial reward, while the prisoner who did not confess ends up in the prison for a longer term. When both prisoners confess, i.e. (D, D), both are given a reduced term.
In the two-player case the strategy pair (D, D) comes out as the unique NE (and the rational outcome) of the game, leading to the situation of both having reduced term. The game offers a dilemma as the rational outcome (D, D) differs from the outcome (C, C), which is an available choice, and for which both prisoners get freedom.
The three-player PD is defined by making the association:
and afterwards imposing the following conditions [55] : a) The strategy S 2 is a dominant choice [1] for each player. For Alice this requires:
and similar inequalities hold for players Bob and Chris. b) A player is better off if more of his opponents choose to cooperate. For Alice this requires: 
and similar relations hold for Bob and Chris.
Translating the above conditions while using the notation introduced in (5) requires: a) β > α, ω > ǫ, θ > δ b) β > θ > ω, α > δ > ǫ c) δ > ω, α > θ, δ > (1/2)(ǫ + θ), α > (1/2)(δ + β)
which define a generalized three-player PD. For example [55] , by letting α = 7, β = 9, δ = 3, ǫ = 0, ω = 1, θ = 5 all of these conditions hold.
When we associate +1 with the Head and −1 with the Tail of a coin, sharing coins (not necessarily unbiased) provides a physical realization of a probabilistic physical system. In the following we consider two setups, both of which use coins in order to play the symmetric threeplayer game (5) . We find that the later setup provides an appropriate arrangement for introducing joint probabilities (associated with an EPR-Bohm setting involving three observers) in the playing of a three-player game.
We note that in the standard EPR-Bohm setting, in a run, each one of the spatially-separated observers chooses one between two directions. A quantum measurement along the two chosen directions, in a run, generate either +1 or −1 as the outcome. That is, in a run one of the four possible outcomes (+1, +1, +1), (+1, +1, −1), (+1, −1, +1), (+1, −1, −1), (−1, +1, +1), (−1, +1, −1), (−1, −1, +1), (−1, −1, −1) emerges.
Three-coin setup
The most natural scenario for playing a three-player game, when they share a probabilistic physical system that involves three coins, is the one when in a run each player is given a coin in a Head state, and 'to flip' or to 'not to flip' are the player's available strategies. We denote Alice's, Bob's, and Chris' strategy 'to flip' by S 1 , S ′ 1 , and S ′′ 1 , respectively, and likewise, we denote Alice's, Bob's, and Chris' strategy 'not to flip' by S 2 , S ′ 2 , and S ′′ 2 , respectively. The three coins are then passed to a referee who rewards players after observing the state of the three coins.
In repeated runs, the players Alice, Bob, and Chris can play mixed strategies denoted by x, y, z ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Here x, y, z are the probabilities to choose S 1 (out of S 1 and S 2 ), S 
In the following, we will use NE when we refer to either a Nash Equilibrium or to Nash Equilibria, as determined by the context. We call this arrangement, which uses three coins to play a threeplayer game, the three-coin setup.
Six-coin setup
The three-player game (5) can also be played using six coins (not necessarily unbiased) instead of the three. This can be arranged as follows. Two coins are assigned to each player before the game begins. In a run each player chooses one out of the two, which defines his/her strategy in the run. Three coins are, therefore, chosen in a run. The three chosen coins are passed to a referee who tosses them together and observes the outcome. Many such outcomes are observed as the process of receiving, choosing, and subsequently tossing the coins is repeated many times.
After many runs, the referee rewards the players according to their strategies (i.e. which coin(s) they have chosen over many runs), the outcomes of several tosses giving rise to the underlying statistics of the coins and from the six coefficients defining the three-player symmetric game defined in Section (2) .
Notice that coins are tossed in each run, which gives the playing of a game an inherently probabilistic character. This paves the way to step into the quantum regime and provides the key for introducing quantum probabilities.
We call this arrangement of using six coins, for playing a three-player game, the six-coin setup. Why introduce a six-coin setup when a three-player game can also be played in three-coin setup?
The answer is provided by the EPR-Bohm setting that involves three observers and 64 joint probabilities. The six coin setup allows us to translate the playing of a three-player game in terms of 64 joint probabilities. When these joint probabilities are quantum mechanical (and are obtained from an EPR-Bohm setting involving three observers) they might have the unusual character of being non-factorizable. That is, the six-coin setup serves as an intermediate step allowing us to see the impact of non-factorizable quantum probabilities on the solution of a game.
In the six-coin setup, by our definition, a player plays a pure strategy 1 when s/he chooses the same coin over all the runs and s/he plays a mixed strategy when s/he chooses his/her first coin with some probability over the runs.
Notice that, by its construction, this setup requires a large number of runs for playing a game, irrespective of whether players play the pure strategies or the mixed strategies, as in either case players' payoffs depend on outcomes of many tosses.
We denote Alice's two coins by S 1 , S 2 ; Bob's two coins by S Heads of a coin is associated (as it is in the three-coin setup) with +1 and tails with −1, and we denote the outcome of Alice's, Bob's, and Chris' coins as π A , π B , and π C , respectively.
Alice's outcome of π A = +1 or −1, whether she goes for the S 1 -coin or the S 2 -coin in a run, is independent of Bob's outcome of π B = +1 or −1 as well as whether he goes for the S ′ 1 -coin or the S ′ 2 -coin in the same run. Also, both of these outcomes are independent of Chris' outcome of π C = +1 or −1 as well as whether he goes for the S ′′ 1 -coin or the S ′′ 2 -coin in the same run. The associated probabilities are, therefore, factorizable in the sense that the probability for a triplet of outcomes can be expressed as the product of probability for each outcome separately. Mathematically, this is expressed by writing joint probabilities as the arithmetic product of their respective marginals, i.e.
where, for example, Bob can set S . Namely, r is the probability of getting head for (Alice's) S 1 -coin; r ′ is the probability of getting head for (Bob's) S ′ 1 -coin; and r ′′ is the probability of getting head for (Chris') S ). Namely, s is the probability of getting head for (Alice's) S 2 -coin; s ′ is the probability of getting head for (Bob's) S ′ 2 -coin; and s ′′ is the probability of getting head for (Chris') S ′′ 2 -coin. Factorizability, then, for example, allows us to write Pr(+1, −1, −1;
Payoff relations and the Nash equilibria
Given how we have defined a 'pure strategy' in the six-coin setup the players' pure-strategy payoff relations can now be written as
where, on right side of each equation, the three constants in brackets correspond to the players Alice, Bob, and Chris respectively. We point out that Eqs. A mixed-strategy game, in the six-coin setup, corresponds to when, over a large number of runs of the game, a player chooses one of the two available coins with some probability. Let x, y, and z be the probabilities with which Alice, Bob, and Chris, respectively, choose the coins S 1 , S ′ 1 , and S ′′ 1 , respectively. The players' six-coin mixed-strategy payoff relations then read,
Notice that the right side of Eq. (22) contains expressions that are given by Eqs. (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) .
Six-coin mixed-strategy payoff relations (22) are mathematically identical to the three-coin mixed-strategy payoff relations (2) . However, these equations are to be interpreted differently as the definitions of what constitutes a strategy in three-and six-coin setups are different. In (2) the numbers x, y, and z are the probabilities with which Alice, Bob, and Chris, respectively, flip the coin that s/he receives. Whereas in (22) the numbers x, y, and z are the probabilities with which, over repeated runs, Alice, Bob, and Chris choose the S 1 -coin, the S
With these definitions the payoff relations (14-21) are re-expressed as
Now, from the definitions (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) , requiring coins to satisfy the constraint (s, s ′ , s ′′ ) = (0, 0, 0) makes a number of the joint probabilities vanish: 
where only those joint probabilities are left that can have non-zero value(s). These (pure strategy) payoff relations ensure that when the joint probabilities (involved in these expressions) become factorizable the classical outcome of the game results.
Three-player quantum games
In the quantum game literature [?, 8, 9, 18-23, 27, 28], three-player games have been studied but it appears that they have attracted less attention then the two-player games. This is understandable as their analysis is often found to be significantly harder even in the classical regime.
As mentioned in Section 1, an interesting example of a three-player quantum game was discussed by Vaidman [13, 14] who described the GHZ paradox [12] as a game among three players. Vaidman constructed a game, and tailored its winning conditions, such that the winning chances for a classical team of three players cannot exceed 75%. A team of quantum players, however, are able to win the game 100% if they share a GHZ state.
An analysis of Vaidman's game shows that it is won 100% by a team of quantum players having access to a probabilistic physical system for which the joint probabilities are non-factorizable in a way described by the winning conditions of the game. These conditions are constructed such that a set of non-factorizable joint probabilities generated by the GHZ state results in the team always winning the game. Although Vaidman's game demonstrates how the GHZ state can be helpful in winning a game, by itself this quantum game does not present a quantization scheme for a general threeplayer noncooperative game. This was achieved by Benjamin and Hayden [18] who developed a multiplayer extension of Eisert et al.'s quantization scheme [9] , originally proposed for two-player noncooperative games. Eisert et al.'s scheme is widely considered to have led to the birth of the area of quantum games.
However, Vaidman's game offers an interesting situation, which motivates one to ask what may happen to a generalized three-player noncooperative symmetric game, when the participating players share a probabilistic system for which joint probabilities are not factorizable. This is precisely the question that we aim to address in the present paper.
Three-player quantum games using EPR-Bohm setting
We consider an EPR-Bohm setting for three spatially-separated observers and use it to play a general three-player symmetric noncooperative game. This setting can be described as follows:
In the EPR-Bohm setting for playing a three-player quantum game, players Alice, Bob, and Chris each receive a particle, in a run, coming from a tripartite state. Each player has to decide one between the two available directions in the run and has to inform the referee of his/her choice. The referee makes a quantum measurement along the three chosen directions with Pauli spin operators. The players' payoff relations are made public at the start of the game and depend on the directions the players choose over a large number of runs (defining their strategies), the matrix of the game, and on the joint probabilities of the measurement outcomes that the referee obtains. a) Three observers, henceforth called the players Alice, Bob, and Chris, are distantly located and are not able to communicate among themselves. b) In a run, each player receives a particle and has to choose one out of the two directions and to inform the referee of his/her choice (henceforth called his/her pure strategy).
c) The referee, after receiving information on the three players' strategies in a run (which are three directions) rotates his Stern-Gerlach type detectors along these directions and makes a measurement using Pauli spin observables.
d) The two directions available to each player correspond to the two kinds of (non-commuting) measurements that can be performed by the referee in a run.
e) The outcome of a measurement, in a run, along any one of the three chosen directions is either +1 or −1.
f) Over a large number of runs, a player can play a mixed strategy when s/he has a linear combination (with normalized and real coefficients) of choosing between the two available directions as the outcomes of quantum measurements for all runs are recorded by the referee.
It can be noticed that in this EPR-Bohm setting, instead of coins, we can let S 1 and S 2 to be Alice's two directions. Similarly, we can let S ′ 1 and S ′ 2 be Bob's two directions, and, similarly, we can let S ′′ 1 and S ′′ 2 be Chris' two directions. As the outcome of a quantum measurement along one of the three directions is +1 or −1 that we have associated to the Head or Tail state of a coin, respectively.
Recall that in our six-coin setup, in a run, each player has to choose one between two coins and to inform this choice to the referee. The referee, after knowing which three coins the players have chosen in that run, tosses them together and obtains a Head or Tail state for each.
Compare this to what happens in the EPR-Bohm setting in which, in a run, the outcome of a quantum measurement is +1 or −1, along each one of three directions chosen by the players. Note that players' strategies in the EPR-Bohm setting are same as they are when they play classical strategies using six coins.
This definition of strategy serves three purposes: a) it allows, in a straight forward fashion, a quantum version of the three-player game from the three-player classical game that is played using six coins b) as the strategies remain identical in both the classical and the quantum games, it seems that the Enk and Pike's argument [56] is avoided 2 c) it allows more direct exploitation of the peculiar non-factorizable quantum mechanical probabilities in terms of game-theoretic outcomes.
One may ask here about the quantum state(s) that are measured by the referee after the players inform him/her of their strategies. In fact, apart from the fact that the proposed setting uses three-partite quantum states, no further restrictions are placed telling what should be the input quantum states. That is, any pure or mixed three-partite states can be used to play the quantum game.
Joint probabilities in EPR-Bohm setting
Using the above setting and noticing the notation for 64 six-coin joint probabilities in (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) convinces one to introduce the same notation for 64 joint probabilities corresponding to the EPRBohm setting for playing a three-player quantum game:
The first equation in (52) (26) are normalized and satisfy the first equation in (52) . The same holds true for the remaining coin probabilities (27-33) as they satisfy the remaining equations in (52) .
Along with the constraints that normalization imposes on joint probabilities, there are other constraints that are imposed by requirements of causal communication. Often these constraints are referred [50] to as the condition of 'parameter independence', 'simple locality', 'signal locality', or 'physical locality'. Essentially, they say, for example, that the probability Pr A (+1; S 1 ) of Alice obtaining the outcome +1 when she plays S 1 is not changed by Bob's choice for S . That is, the probability of a particular measurement outcome on one part of the system is independent of which kind of measurement is performed by the referee on the other part(s) [50] . Causal communication constraints make it impossible for the participating agents to acausually exchange the classical information.
The probability Pr A (+1; S 1 ) corresponds to when Alice chooses S 1 and the referee obtains the outcome +1 along S 1 . Independence of Bob's and Chris' choices requires that,
which can be expanded using ( Using the definitions (44-51) for Alice's choices these constraints read strategy is then defined to be the probability of playing one of his/her pure strategies. As the sets of strategies remain exactly identical in both the classical and the quantum forms of the game, it difficult to construct an Enk and Pike type argument [56] for a quantum game played in the EPR-Bohm setting.
In the literature the wording 'quantum games' has been used in many different contexts, which involve games and quantum settings in one way or the other. In view of this the present paper comes in line with the approach towards quantum games that originated with Eisert et al.'s quantization of Prisoner's Dilemma [9] , where they proposed a general procedure to quantize a given noncooperative two-player game. This approach is distinct, and is to be contrasted, from other approaches that also use the wording 'quantum game', in that it is placed in the context of classical game theory with the use of the Nash equilibrium concept. For example, in some approaches both 'the game' and its 'winning condition(s)' are arbitrarily defined, tailored or constructed, in order to show that only using a quantum-mechanical implementation the winning condition(s) can be fulfilled. In contrast, this paper begins by defining payoff relations, instead of the 'winning condition(s)', and then finds how game-theoretic outcome(s) of a noncooperative game may change in relation to the quantum mechanical aspects of a probabilistic physical system, which the players share in order to play the game.
The approach followed in this paper establishes a relationship between the 'classicality' of the physical system (expressed by the joint probabilities being factorizable) and a 'classical game', in the sense that using a classical system to play a game results in the classical game. Establishing this relationship allows us in the following step to find how non-classical (thus quantum) behavior of the physical system (expressed by the joint probabilities being non-factorizable) may change the outcome(s) of the game. This paper considers very unusual non-factorizable joint probabilities, which may emerge from an entangled quantum state, by putting forward three-and six-coin setups in order to play a threeplayer symmetric non-cooperative game. In the six-coin setup, players choose coins in each run, not necessarily unbiased, which are subsequently tossed and the outcome of each toss is observed. This setup translates playing of the game in terms of 64 joint probabilities. In the following step, this translation of the game allows us to consider the corresponding quantum game by bringing in the same number of joint probabilities, which now may not be factorizable. We then consider how these quantum mechanical probabilities may change the Nash equilibria of the game under the constraint that factorizable joint probabilities must lead to the classical solution of the game.
We achieve this by re-expressing players' payoffs in terms of 64 joint probabilities p i , the players' strategies x, y, z and the coefficients defining the game. We then use Nash inequalities to find the equilibria. We find constraints on p i which ensure that for factorizable p i the game gives the classical outcome and thus it becomes interpretable as a classical mixed-strategy game. This is carried out by playing the game in the six-coin setup and using Nash inequalities to obtain constraints on the coin probabilities r, s, r ′ , s ′ , r ′′ , s ′′ , which reproduce the outcome of the classical mixed-strategy game. We use the relations (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) , resulting from p i being factorizable, to translate the constraints on r, s, r ′ , s ′ , r ′′ , s ′′ in terms of constraints on p i . We refer to the standard three-party EPR-Bohm setup and allow p i to be non-factorizable, while retaining the constraints on p i . We then ask if non-factorizability may lead to the emergence of new solution(s) of the game. In case non-factorizability leads to new solution(s), given as a triplet(s) (x * , y * , z * ), there is always is a set of 64 non-factorizable joint probabilities that are associated with it.
Our results show that non-factorizability leads to a new NE for three-player PD that is paretooptimal. As we recall from the Ref. [42] that this does not turn out to be the case for the two-player PD and the classical NE remains intact even when the players are given access to non-factorizable probabilities. There exist, however, examples of two-player games for which non-factorizability indeed leads to new NE. The game of chicken [1] is one such example. It seems that from a game-theoretic perspective the tri-partite quantum correlations are different and stronger relative to the bi-partite quantum correlations. Recall that non-factorizability, as it is defined above, is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the violation of Bell's inequality. That is, a non-factorizable set of joint probabilities may not violate Bell's inequality but a set of joint probabilities that violates Bell's inequality must be non-factorizable. This might motivate one to ask about the exact connection between non-factorizability, entanglement, and the violation of Bell's inequality. However, non-factorizability being only a necessary condition for the violation of Bell's inequality seems to go in line with the known result that a separable mixed state can violate Bell's inequality.
The probabilistic framework towards quantum games, developed in Ref. [42] and extended to multiplayer games in this paper, uses the classical concept of probability, which is well known to be more restrictive than the quantum notion [57] . Essentially, the classical concept describes 'probability' as being a number between zero and one and that for a joint probability of two events this number is less or equal to the numbers corresponding to each of the events. Though being more restrictive, as Pitowski [57] describes it, this concept is "nevertheless rooted in some very basic intuition." If quantum games can be expressed in terms of this basic concept this can only be helpful to introduce this area to researchers outside the quantum domain.
It is relevant here to point out that the probabilistic framework for quantum games, proposed originally for two-player games in Ref. [42] and extended to three-player games in the present paper, appears close to Einstein's statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics [58, 59] . The key assertion of this interpretation describes a quantum state (pure or otherwise), representing an ensemble of similarly prepared systems, and need not provide a complete description of an individual system. By using coin tosses in order to translate playing of a classical game in terms of joint probabilities and subsequently introducing unusual quantum mechanical non-factorizable joint probabilities, the suggested framework uses the concept of an ensemble of similarly prepared systems. Multiple coin tosses, which are central to the present framework, are found helpful in understanding how quantum mechanical predictions in quantum game theory do not pertain to a single measurement, but relate to an ensemble of similar measurements.
